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Abstract. It is current orthodoxy in biological game theory that in animal contests with easily recognized 
asymmetries between the contestants, an asymmetry will be used to settle the dispute. Here it is argued 
that, if the winning of contests plays a major part in gaining reproductive success, an individual will not be 
selected to respect an asymmetry which will place it always in the losing role. Asymmetries that create 
consistent losers of this sort are termed divisive asymmetries. Divisive asymmetries cannot be used to settle 
important contests in an evolutionarily stable way because the consistent losers will have no incentive to 
respect them. 
WHEN  BOURGEOIS  MAY  NOT  BE  AN 
ESS 
One of the most widely accepted  successes of the 
Evolutionarily  Stable  Strategy  (ESS;  Maynard 
Smith & Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982) 
approach to our understanding of  animal beha- 
viour is the explanation it provides of the observa- 
tion  that in fights between territory  holders and 
intruders, the territory holders generally win. The 
explanation is that ownership is used as an asym- 
metry to settle the dispute in favour of the owner. 
The main result from ESS theory supporting this 
explanation is that even in the unlikely case that 
ownership was uncorrelated  with fighting ability 
and with the value of the territory to an  individual, 
ownership  could  still  be  used  as  an  arbitrary 
asymmetry  to  settle  disputes  in  favour  of  the 
owner.  How  much  more  likely  it  is,  then,  that 
ownership will be used to settle the dispute without 
real  fighting  when  it  is,  in  fact, correlated  with 
fighting ability or with the value of the territory to 
an individual. This is the argument advanced by 
Maynard Smith & Parker (1976). 
My main  purpose  here is  to argue that in  an 
important  class  of  cases,  which  can  be  roughly 
characterized as those involving long term territor- 
ies,  ownership  cannot  be  used  as  an arbitrary 
asymmetry, or even, to an extent, as a correlated 
asymmetry. The argument will apply more gener- 
ally  to  all  ‘divisive asymmetries’,  a  term  I  shall 
define  later.  So  far  as  territorial  disputes  are 
concerned,  this  will  leave  us  with  the  simpler 
argument  that  if  owners  do win  fights  against 
intruders, then it is because the owners are bigger 
and better fighters. Various comments that follow 
naturally will be made after the argument has been 
given. 
Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) model a terri- 
torial dispute as an asymmetric hawk-dove game. 
That is, each contestant knows its role (owner or 
intruder), and has a choice of two strategies called 
H and D.  The sense in which a contestant knows its 
role  is  that it  is  allowed  to  make  its  choice  of 
strategy depend on its role, permitting for example 
a strategy that Maynard Smith & Parker call 
‘Bourgeois’: if  owner play H, if intruder play D. 
They showed that Bourgeois is an ESS when V,  the 
value of winning the fight, is less than C, the cost of 
losing the fight. The standard payoffs for the hawk- 
dove game are represented as: to H, (V-C)/2 
against H, and V against D; to D. 0 against H, and 
V/2   against D. 
While the logic of Maynard Smith & Parker’s 
argument  is  not disputed  here.  they  neglect  an 
interesting  property  of  V  and  C  that  is  highly 
relevant  to the likelihood  of the condition  V<C 
being fulfilled. The benefits of winning and costs of 
losing  are likely  to depend  on the fighting rules 
adopted  by  the  population,  for  the  following 
reasons. In a population that respects ownership, 
the winner of a fight is likely to retain the territory 
for a long time: while  in  a population in  which 
territories change hands frequently, the winner of a 
fight is  likely to lose it again soon. The value of 
winning  is  therefore higher  in  a population that 
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respects ownership and lower in a population that 
does not. 
The  cost  of  losing  may  also  depend  on  the 
fighting rules adopted by the population. The cost 
is  the difference  in  expected  future reproductive 
success  (EFRS) made by  playing  H  and losing, 
compared  with  playing  D  (i.e.  retreating).  In  a 
population in which  reproduction can take place 
only by territory holders, and in which ownership is 
respected, and in which vacant territories are rare, 
an individual who is not an owner and follows the 
common convention of respecting ownership will 
reproduce only in the unlikely event it discovers a 
vacant territory. Playing H and losing, even if  it 
meant certain death, could not be much worse than 
this  small chance of  reproduction. This  has  the 
important implication that in the limit, as vacant 
territories become more and more rare, the cost of 
fighting  becomes  zero.  This  of  course  renders 
unfulfillable the condition V< C for the Bourgeois 
strategy to be an ESS. This means that Bourgeois is 
invadable by a strategy that plays H both as owner 
and as intruder. The logic of playing H as intruder 
is simply that the intruder has nothing to lose and 
much to gain. 
In a population that does not respect ownership, 
on the other hand, the cost of fighting could be 
high, as the EFRS of a loser will include reproduc- 
tion on the reasonable chance that the loser today 
will be a territory holder tomorrow. 
How do these considerations  affect  the evolu- 
tionary stability of Bourgeois? A population domi- 
nated  by  Bourgeois  will  be  a  population  that 
respects  ownership,  and we  have  seen  that  this 
tends to increase V and to decrease C. Both of these 
tendencies make the stability condition for Bour- 
geois,  V<C, less  likely  to  be  fulfilled.  In  the 
particular case where there are no vacant territories 
and all  reproduction  is  by  territory  holders, we 
have  already  seen  that  the  stability  condition 
cannot be fulfilled. We can express this by saying 
that under plausible conditions, when the depen- 
dence of Vand C on population strategies is taken 
into account as they certainly should be, Bourgeois 
is not an ESS. 
The assumptions  required  to make the  Bour- 
geois strategy not an ESS are (1) territories last for 
some time, (2) reproduction requires a territory, 
and (3) vacant territories are rare. Small violations 
of these conditions will have only a small effect on 
the arguments. Note too that the same conditions 
for fighting apply to the owners as to the intruders. 
When  vacant  territories  are  common,  and  it 
becomes not worthwhile for an intruder to fight, it 
also becomes not worthwhile for a territory holder 
to fight. In both cases, it is better to avoid the risk of 
injury and depend on obtaining a vacant territory 
soon. 
Davies  (1978)  gives an example  of  short-term 
territories,  in  which  speckled  wood  butterflies, 
Pararge aegeria, occupy patches of sunlight on the 
ground in a wood. Even if ownership was respected 
in this case, possession of a territory now does not 
guarantee possession of the same territory in 2  h 
time  because  the  territory may well  have  disap- 
peared. Respect  for ownership will  therefore not 
make  V very  high. Equally, non-possession  of a 
territory now does not make so very unlikely  the 
possession of a territory in 2 h time, because new 
territories are continually being created. Respect 
for ownership will not therefore make C very low. 
It is probably also the case that not all reproduction 
takes place on territories. This example is a clear 
case where the Bourgeois strategy may still be an 
ESS despite the arguments given  above, through 
violation of all three assumptions. 
It is worth pointing out that not only is the use of 
ownership as an arbitrary asymmetry ruled  out 
under the three assumptions, but also the use of 
ownership as a correlated asymmetry in which, for 
example,  owners  are  better  at  fighting  than 
intruders. A non-owner with the prospect of no 
reproduction if D is played is going to play H even 
if it has only a small chance of winning. Owners will 
therefore have  to fight  to retain their  territories, 
and not merely persuade intruders by  displaying 
that the intruder would very likely lose a fight. 
I have now finished the main argument about 
ownership, and wish to go on to various topics that 
arise from it. First, I shall justify and amplify the 
assertions made earlier about how costs and bene- 
fits should be interpreted in game theory models, 
stressing  the  possible  frequency  dependence  of 
costs and benefits. That payoffs should have some- 
thing to do with number of offspring is unsurpris- 
ing, but to my knowledge, no one has previously 
considered  exactly how payoffs should be calcu- 
lated from information about offspring. Second, I 
shall extend the scope of the argument to include all 
divisive  asymmetries  (shortly  to be  defined),  of 
which ownership is only one example. Third, I shall 
give a brief  account of why territory owners may 
seem to win  rather more fights against intruders 
than  they  really  do.  Fourth,  I  shall  consider 464 Animal Behaviour, 35, 2 
whether ESS models really do explain restraint in 
animal aggression. 
HOW  PAYOFFS  ARE  DERIVED  FROM 
OFFSPRING NUMBER 
The maxim ‘payoffs  should be  offspring’ has no 
doubt gained ready acceptance. My purpose here is 
to  make this  notion  more  precise,  and  then  to 
provide an example to show how this more precise 
notion can be applied to an ESS model, so that the 
terms  which  are  elementary  in  the  model  are 
defined in terms of numbers of offspring. Game 
theory assumes that individuals maximize payoffs, 
while the theory of natural selection entitles us to 
assume that individuals maximize number of off- 
spring. We therefore decide what costs and benefits 
mean according to the principle that the strategy 
that maximizes payoff must also maximize number 
of  offspring. This means that payoff  must equal 
number  of  offspring,  possibly  with  a  constant 
subtracted, and possibly multiplied  by  a positive 
number. The constant and positive number may be 
called scaling constants, since they merely change 
the scale  on which  payoffs  are measured.  Effec- 
tively, the entries in the payoff matrix should be the 
expected future reproductive success (EFRS) of an 
individual in the circumstances defined by its own 
strategy and that of its opponent. This procedure 
answers the question of what in principle the entries 
in the payoff matrix are. It can also tell us whether 
the  entries in  the  payoff  matrix  depend  on the 
frequencies of strategies in the population. 
This principle can be illustrated by application to 
the War of  Attrition of  Maynard  Smith (1974). 
Individuals  maximize  their  payoff,  which  com- 
prises the benefit from winning if they win (let this 
be  B(t), allowing  it  to  depend  on  the  contest 
duration), and their  costs for fighting up to the 
duration of the contest whether they win or not (let 
this  be  C(t),  and note that this  makes  the  cost 
function of the War of Attrition models 
c(t) =dC(t)/dt). Now let us define Nl(t) as the EFRS 
if the individual loses after a contest duration oft, 
and Nw(t) as the EFRS if the individual wins after a 
contest of duration t. Then, since individuals must 
maximize their EFRS, which consists of Nw(t) if 
they win and Nl(t) if they lose, and using a and K as 
scaling constants, 
Nl(t) = K- C(t)/a 
Nw(t)  = K+ B( t)/a - C(t)/a 
and this yields after a simple manipulation 
These expressions define what the costs and bene- 
fits mean in the War of Attrition model. In words, 
the  benefit  of  winning  after  duration  t  is  the 
difference in EFRS between winning at t and losing 
at t. The cost of fighting per unit time is the 
difference per unit time made to the EFRS condi- 
tional on losing. This provides an example of how 
to work out the meaning of costs and benefits in a 
game theory model. For attempts to measure costs 
and benefits  in  modelling  the  War  of  Attrition 
without  apparent  knowledge  of  this  result,  see 
Riechert (1978, 1979) and Parker & Thompson 
(1980). It may be objected that the EFRS  conditio- 
nal  on  winning  and  losing  is  very  difficult  to 
measure.  This  is  true,  and  it  forces  on us  the 
corollary that the costs and benefits in the War of 
Attrition  are very  difficult  to measure.  But  we 
cannot really expect to get away without measuring 
(or estimating, or making assumptions about) such 
obviously  important  quantities  as the  effects  of 
strategies on expected future number of offspring, 
in an evolutionary model. 
DIVISIVE ASYMMETRIES 
I now move on to extend the argument to a wider 
class of asymmetries. An intruder plays H because 
it has nothing to lose when the common strategy is 
Bourgeois. The reason it has nothing to lose is that 
it will always be on the losing side if it plays D. This 
also applies to an asymmetry based on adult size. 
The smallest individual will always lose fights if size 
is  respected,  and  if  the  analogue  of  the  three 
conditions listed above holds, then this is enough to 
show that respect for the size asymmetry cannot be 
an ESS. For size, the analogous condition would be 
that all reproduction  is performed by winners of 
fights. The analogues of duration of ownership and 
rarity of vacant territories are automatically satis- 
fied if we assume that adult size is fixed. The crucial 
feature of an asymmetry that creates the ‘desper- 
ado  effect’,  leading  to  the  undermining  of  the 
stability  of  respect  for  the  asymmetry,  is  that 
respect for the asymmetry creates a class of indi- 
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the asymmetry. I suggest that these may be called 
divisive asymmetries. 
An example of an undivisive  asymmetry is age. 
Although younger individuals will  always lose to 
the individuals that are older than they, there will 
come a  time  when  they  themselves  are old  and 
younger individuals lose to them. This prevents the 
desperado effect, because by fighting an individual 
risks injury and death, and if it dies it will lose the 
reproduction it can expect to gain when it is older. 
There is  no individual that is  guaranteed  to  be 
always on the losing side of the asymmetry. Settling 
a  dispute  in  favour  of  the young is  not stable, 
however. This is because once old an individual will 
for the rest of its life be on the losing side of the 
asymmetry, and will have no incentive not to risk 
injury and death in fights. 
The  meaning  of  divisive  asymmetry  is  then 
perhaps better expressed as follows: an asymmetry 
is  divisive  if  respect  for  it  creates  a  class  of 
individuals that are from some point of their lives 
bound  to  be  always  on  the  losing  side  of  the 
asymmetry. The logical source of the ‘from some 
point of their lives’ is the assumption that in a fight 
they risk the reproduction remaining to them from 
that point in their lives through the possibility of 
injury. 
WHY  OWNERS  MAY  IN  FACT  WIN 
MORE FIGHTS 
The next point is why, in view of the arguments 
given  above, territory  owners win  fights against 
intruders. This is, of course, a genuine biological 
problem rather than a matter that can be settled by 
algebra. However, thinking in game theory terms 
about the behaviour of non-owners does suggest 
possible reasons. In trying to find a vacant territory 
efficiently, an animal must  provoke owners into 
showing themselves quickly, and then it must leave. 
Having decided  it  must fight  for a  territory,  an 
animal  may  assess  its  chances  against  various 
opponents by making exploratory sallies. Both of 
these activities will give the appearance of an owner 
defeating an intruder. The all-out fight against the 
weakest  owner  will  therefore  be  much  outnum- 
bered in the observer’s notebook by what appear to 
be  conventionally  settled  contests,  even  though 
they  are but  part  of  a  single,  consistent policy, 
culminating in a real fight. A model capturing a 
number of aspects of this strategy for non-owners is 
~ 
given by Parker (1974), and it is interesting to note 
that in the escalated  fights  that did occur in his 
model, ownership itself conferred no advantage. So 
we see how a sensible strategy on the part of a non- 
owner, which ultimately involves escalation when 
necessary to a fight in which ownership is unimpor- 
tant, can give the appearance of respect for owner- 
ship. 
The  example  of  the  speckled  wood  butterfly 
given by Davies (1 978) was given as a case where 
Bourgeois could be an ESS. The foregoing discus- 
sion  suggests  that  the  intruding  butterflies  are 
merely seeking information about whether a given 
sunny spot is occupied or  not, and that if they could 
detect occupation from further away the intruders 
would never intrude. So even when the Bourgeois 
strategy is an ESS, and is at work in a population, 
the natural  biological  interpretation is  that  the 
intruder is  seeking information  and not a  fight. 
After all, why  should a non-owner  approach an 
owner if the conventional outcome is inevitable and 
known to them both beforehand? The reason the 
confrontation takes place  at all is that the non- 
owner was hoping  to find  something else in  the 
territory:  either  the  absence  of  an  owner,  or 
information about the likely fighting ability of the 
owner. 
ARE  LARGE CONTEST COSTS PAID IN 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES? 
Next I consider one of the ways in which ESS 
theory is supposed to have improved our under- 
standing of animal conflicts. It is widely believed 
that ESS theory has provided an alternative expla- 
nation of restraint in animal fighting, so rendering 
unnecessary in one respect ideas of group selection. 
In the simplest ESS games (the hawk-dove game 
and the simple War ofAttrition) there is restraint in 
the sense that animals do  not automatically fight as 
hard as possible  in every case;  but  on the other 
hand,  the  contest  costs  suffered  are  equal  in 
magnitude to the value of winning. Whether these 
models  predict  restraint  in  fighting  therefore 
depends on one’s initial expectations; they predict 
much more fighting than would be advantageous 
for the population as a whole. The use of ownership 
as an asymmetry, however, seemed a much clearer 
case of ESS theory predicting restraint. How is this 
affected  by  the unsettling  of  the Bourgeois  ESS 
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three conditions, together with the original stability 
condition of Maynard Smith & Parker (1976), 
under which  Bourgeois fails to be an ESS can be 
summarized by  saying that Bourgeois  can be  an 
ESS only in fights whose outcome is not of great 
importance to the animals. Maynard Smith (1982) 
cites  the example  of  male  lions  settling  disputes 
over access to oestrous females by the Bourgeois 
principle. While access to oestrous females in total 
is obviously of supervening importance for a male 
lion, the outcome of one fight would be access to 
only one oestrous female. We  expect  animals to 
fight  seriously  over  long-term  territories,  even 
when they incur risks of injury and death. 
THE  STATUS  OF  THE  BOURGEOIS 
PRINCIPLE 
The  extent  to  which  the  Bourgeois  principle  is 
overthrown  by  these  arguments  about  divisive 
asymmetries depends on which aspects are consi- 
dered. It remains true that the fact of ownership 
can be a potent force in animals’ lives, and that the 
day to day rules followed by animals may well show 
a  ‘respect  for ownership’.  Settling  potential  dis- 
putes (mainly without any aggression or appear- 
ance of a dispute) over comparatively unimportant 
matters may well proceed by ownership. From this 
point of view, my arguments leave the Bourgeois 
principle intact. 
However, some aspects of the Bourgeois princi- 
ple are affected. We have seen that when Bourgeois 
is  the ESS, conflicts can occur only by  accident, 
because there is no sense in an intruder beginning a 
fight it knows in advance it will lose. The Bourgeois 
principle is therefore irrelevant to a study of real 
fights, and cannot be used to explain why owners 
win  them. That, if  true,  is  presumably  because 
owners are good at fighting. Another aspect is to 
ask: how is it determined which  individuals  own 
territories? The Bourgeois principle suggests that 
the answer is luck or chance; but we have seen that 
the appearance of the Bourgeois strategy is quite 
consistent with  a  situation  in  which  real  fights 
decide ownership. Or, we can ask: why do territor- 
ies change hands? The Bourgeois principle suggests 
only when an individual abandons its territory; the 
revision  given  above  suggests  that  territories 
change hands because of real fights. Finally, we can 
ask, how large are the total contest costs paid in 
fights over  territories, compared to the value  of 
those territories? The Bourgeois principle suggests 
there  will  be  no  contest  costs,  and  this  is  an 
important part of its appeal. Our revision suggests 
there will be contest costs that are roughly propor- 
tional to the number of the dispossessed. In this 
more blood and guts world, the territories are held 
by bigger and better individuals, and it is important 
to distinguish between  respect for ownership and 
respect for owners. Ownership can therefore play 
an important part in animals’ lives, mainly in the 
avoidance  of  disputes  and  the  appearance  of 
deference  to owners;  but  in  understanding  real 
fights, which individuals hold territories, why terri- 
tories change hands, and whether contest costs are 
incurred  in  fights over  territories,  the Bourgeois 
principle can be misleading. 
In conclusion, Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) 
proposed  that  territorial  disputes  are  settled  in 
favour of the owner because ownership can be used 
as an arbitrary asymmetry to avoid contest costs. I 
have argued that ownership of a long-term terri- 
tory  is  a  divisive  asymmetry, respect  for  which 
creates a set of ‘desperados’, for which the cost of 
fighting when correctly calculated turns out to be 
very small, leading to the evolutionary instability of 
respect for ownership. The argument applies more 
generally  to all  divisive  asymmetries,  which  can 
include adult size. The use of asymmetries to settle 
conflicts will often cause the costs and benefits of 
fighting to depend on the frequencies of strategies 
in the population, and at least in the cases consi- 
dered here this has important consequences for the 
biological  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the 
models. 
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